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Built in 1917, the Canadian-designed and built cantilever
bridge near Quebec City still stands as the longest such span
in the world. It was designed for both rail tracks and road-
ways; in later years, the roadways were expanded by remov-
ing one rail track. The first bridge attempted on the site col-
lapsed in 1907 during construction; a thorough engineering
enquiry showed that this collapse was due to poor design
and not to any metallurgical failure. Completion of the new
bridge, originally planned for 1916, was interrupted when
the suspended mid-span fell due to failure of a cast hoisting
saddle. A successful bridge was finally opened in 1917. This
bridge was based on K member panels that reduced distor-
tion when loaded, which facilitated construction. (The K
design has been employed in the construction of several
other bridges.) In terms of critical components, the K mem-
ber panels included high-strength nickel steel. Because of
limited rolling capability in the fledgling Canadian steel
industry, most of the material for the new bridge was
imported from the United States. In 1970, the Pierre
Laporte suspension bridge (Canada’s longest suspension
bridge) was built along side the Quebec Bridge to serve as a
six-lane auto-route.
Introduction
At the turn of the 20th century, Quebec City was isolated
on the north shore of the St. Lawrence because significant
populations and industrial centres were mainly located on
the south shore, in Montreal and the Eastern Townships to
the west, and in the Gaspé to the east. On just the other side
of the St. Lawrence, rail lines extended from Montreal to
both the Maritimes and the Gaspé. However, east of
Montreal, road traffic of growing volume depended on fer-
ries to cross the river. It was therefore decided to build a
bridge at Quebec City. This bridge would need to be long
and high in order to accommodate ocean ships bound for
Montreal.
In this paper, issues surrounding construction of a
bridge at Quebec City are explained thoroughly. The devel-
opment of a cantilever design, which seemed the only solu-
tion at the time, is described. The collapse of the first
attempted bridge and the resulting conclusions put forth by
the Royal Commission of Enquiry are examined in detail to
clarify design problems and the possibility of metallurgical
defects. The advantages of the final Canadian K-panel
design are then described in association with the use of
high-strength steel. The importance of the Quebec Bridge
to both future design development and to regional trans-
port is considered.
Planning the Bridge
Because of the geographic intrusion of Maine, the rail
lines from the Gaspé Peninsula and from both New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia ran along the southern bank
of the St. Lawrence, with terminals in Lévis (which is
across the river from Quebec City). In the early 1900s,
there were rail lines from Quebec City to Montreal, where
there were two low-level bridges (Ponts du Quebec, 1975;
McQueen, 2008a, 2008b), and the Great Northern line
extended almost straight west. North of the river, there
were prospects for lines to be built towards Chicoutimi,
which was not yet of industrial significance, and for a line
eastward along the north shore. Partly because Quebec
was not an industrial city or a final destination for ocean
shipping, none of the railways had compelling reasons for
establishing a bridge in the region. Provincial or civic gov-
ernments did not feel any great economic or electorate
pressure to invest in one. It therefore fell to a consortium
of local business leaders to provide a bridge that could
prove profitable by tolling the various railroad companies
and the public.
After several failed efforts to drum up sufficient
capital, the Quebec Bridge and Railway Company (QBRC)
was incorporated and began the task of selecting a bridge
site (Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908; Steinman &
Watson, 1957; Smith, 1964; Plowden, 1974; Ponts du Quebec,
1975; Middleton, 2001). The St. Lawrence River narrows
between high cliffs to the west of Quebec City and then
widens significantly to the east, with relatively low banks. At
Isle d’Orleans, there are two somewhat narrower channels,
but the banks are not very high. Because of the high fre-
quency of large ship traffic, a high bridge was essential. It
was decided that the optimum site would be from Chaudière
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to Sainte-Foy (Fig. 1); it would be possible to transport
equipment to both sides by rail. After a call for tenders,
QBRC let the contract to the lowest bidder, Phoenix Bridge
Co. of Pennsylvania, which had extensive experience and a
good reputation. However, following the completion of pre-
liminary designs for the specified live load that determined
the overall structure for the dead weight and for the dimen-
sions of the members, the project went into abeyance
because of insufficient funds (Quebec Bridge Enquiry
Report, 1908; Middleton, 2001). Normally, the next stage
would have been the design of the bracing and splicing to
rigidly tie together the compound beams that constitute
individual members, as well as other stabilizing members.
Then the dimensions of the members that carry the entire
load would have been recalculated.
Developments in Bridge Design
Brief discussions of bridge evolution have been presented
in the two prior papers of this series, the Victoria Box-
Girder Bridge and the Victoria Truss Bridge (McQueen,
2008a, 2008b). Notably, as described in the discussion sur-
rounding the Victoria Truss Bridge, the height of a truss
must increase as the span and load increase; this propor-
tional relationship places the maximum dead weight at the
centre, which in itself requires a more substantial truss. One
design that overcomes this challenge is the suspension
bridge, in which the load is supported by the cables.
Fortunately, after the introduction of steel, it became possi-
ble to produce wire (the strongest form of steel) and still
retain suitable toughness. The use of many strands of wire
overcame the potential for random defects. Such a bridge
required a rigid deck that could absorb the vibrations of the
live load and redistribute the weight along the cable. Thus,
the price for sufficient rigidity, especially for railway bridges,
was a heavy deck with large cables. Towers were needed to
sustain the entire load and, hence, piers with substantial
foundations were essential; these piers would require com-
plex and dangerous pressurized caissons to descend into the
river bottom. An example of a very successful bridge of the
period is the Brooklyn Bridge (1883), which was built by the
Roeblings and was 480 metres (or 1,596 feet) in length
(Steinman & Watson, 1957; Smith, 1964; Plowden, 1974;
Petroski, 1995).
The cantilever bridge has a structure that appears like a
truss centred on the piers, so that the parts on each side bal-
ance each other (Fig. 2; Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report,
1908; Duggan, 1918; Steinman & Watson, 1957; Smith,
1964; Plowden, 1974; Ball, 1987; Petroski, 1995; Middleton,
2001). The trusses taper towards the centre of the span so
the dead load is lightest there. The bridge is inherently
stiffer than the suspension type, but tends to be much heav-
ier; hence, it requires substantial central towers and piers,
which can pose difficulties for construction. In a pattern
opposite to the simple truss, the upper members are under
tension and the lower members are under compression, so
that a large cross-section is necessary to avoid buckling. The
cantilever bridge also has the advantage that the main span,
supported by the anchor span, can be extended across the
river; this anchor span could either be built earlier on a con-
struction framework or simultaneously in balance.
While this type of cantilever bridge had been introduced
in 1867 for long span railroad bridges (greater than 120
metres), the first partly steel, a Canadian cantilever bridge
(which was 151 metres or 495 feet in length) was built over
the Niagara Gorge in 1883 by C.C. Schneider (Steinman &
Watson, 1957; Smith, 1964; Plowden, 1974). The first all-
steel bridges were of cantilever type; the first in the United
States, built in 1879, ran 151 metres across the Missouri
River and the first in Canada, built in 1886 by C.C.
Schneider, crossed Siska Creek in the Fraser River Gorge,
British Columbia (Plowden, 1974). In 1889, two record-
breaking spans of 520 metres were constructed across the
Forth estuary in Scotland (Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report,
1908; Duggan, 1918; Ball, 1987; Middleton, 2001). The
twin spans were built outward from the land in both direc-
tions from double columns and piers, having tapered tubu-
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Fig. 1. The Quebec Bridge is on a site just to the west of Quebec City with high cliffs well suited for
a span over the shipping channel. This is markedly different from the very wide low crossing of the
Victoria Truss Bridge at Montreal that is about 230 kilometres up the river (McQueen, 2008a,
2008b). The Inter-Colonial RR (now CN) and also two more recent crossings of the river are marked.
Fig. 2. The complete bridge viewed from the North Shore, emphasizing the straight lower girder
chords (compression) and upper forged eyebars (tension). The K members in each bay minimized
distortion and facilitated erection (Duggan, 1918; Middleton, 2001).
lar members with a plate and rib construction. The Scottish
bridges, designed by J. Fowler and B. Baker, were cut and
shaped on site over a period of four years, with a work force
of about 4,000 experienced shipbuilders under the most
able direction of W. Arrol (Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report,
1908; Duggan, 1918; Ball, 1987; Middleton, 2001).
The steelwork design of cantilever bridges included the
location of every rivet that, when driven hot, clinched the
pieces together rigidly (Lemieux & Morentz, 1968; Fisher &
Struik, 1974). This technique was explained and illustrated
for a critical Quebec Bridge joint in the fabrication account
of the Victoria Truss Bridge (McQueen, 2008b). Moreover,
with the exception of the Forth Bridge described above, the
common construction practice was to fabricate all the mem-
bers in the shop to as large a size as permitted by the trans-
port facilities. The plates were cut and bent into angles and
clamped together, rivet holes were bored and the rivets were
driven by C-shaped hydraulic presses that were supported
on cranes (Fig. 3; Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908;
Duggan, 1918; Middleton, 2001). All parts to be trans-
ported separately and joined in the field were assembled
with splice plates and drilled with rivet holes to ensure
proper alignment. Many large bays or assemblies were con-
nected by pins (up to 60 centimetres in diameter); this
meant that large holes had to be accurately milled and the
parts had to be assembled to ensure proper fit. There were
often problems of assembly on the bridges because of distor-
tions caused by gravity on the bays that differed from the
manner of support on the drilling or milling machines.
Alignment of rivet holes was attained by using jacks or pos-
sibly waiting until further additions of components cor-
rected the situation (Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908;
Duggan, 1918; Middleton, 2001).
The Bridge that Collapsed
The first attempt at building a bridge near Quebec City
was carried out by Phoenix Bridge Company of
Pennsylvania, which had been contracted by a Quebec busi-
ness consortium. The Phoenix Bridge Company design was
completed by P.L. Slapzka and accepted by T. Cooper, who
was a consulting engineer to the QBRC. Cooper had wide
experience and a good reputation in railway bridges in the
United States; however, being in poor health and close to
retirement, he appointed a young and inexperienced engi-
neer to represent him (Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report,
1908; Smith, 1964; Watson, 1975; Petroski, 1995;
Middleton, 2001). Because the QBRC was not an operating
railroad, it had a chief engineer with limited experience.
The fabrication of the bridge components had proceeded
without incident in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, shops and all
the steel had been tested to ensure that it met specifications.
The bridge construction began on the south side of the St.
Laurence River, so that, by August 1907, the anchor and
main span arms were complete (Fig. 4); the main travelling
crane was about to be dismantled and some work had
started on the suspended span (Quebec Bridge Enquiry
Report, 1908; Smith, 1964; Middleton, 2001).
Because of shape differences between the shop and under
load, some of the joints had not completely closed upon ini-
tial erection; a crew was employed to fill in rivets as holes
sagged into alignment. However, some points failed to fit
properly and consideration was given to using jacks for clo-
sure. The workmen reported that some rivets had popped
and the fit at some joints was getting worse (Quebec Bridge
Enquiry Report, 1908; Smith, 1964; Middleton, 2001). The
engineers on the site wired Cooper and Slapzka for instruc-
tions, but none were forthcoming so Cooper’s representative
decided to consult with him in person. On the morning of
August 29, 1907, the bridge collapsed, dropping downwards
and pulling the tower over so that the tension bars on one
arm remained stretched out in alignment (Fig. 4).
Unfortunately, 75 men were killed in the collapse and only
11 survived (Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908; Smith,
1964; Middleton, 2001).
Examination of the collapsed bridge showed that the
lower chords near the central column had buckled after the
reinforcements between the four girders popped off and
that some girders had bent 180 degrees (Fig. 5; Quebec
Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908; Smith, 1964; Middleton,
2001). Extensive examination of the wreckage indicated
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Fig. 3. The Quebec Bridge’s main lower chord (which extends from the tower to the junction of the
first and second bays) consists of four fabricated girders braced together with one longitudinal splice
at the site. The significant role of the rivets is clear in their carefully designed arrays. This chord has
about double the section of the slender one that failed on the Phoenix Bridge (Fig. 5; Duggan, 1918;
Middleton, 2001).
Fig. 4. General views of the south structure of the Phoenix Bridge at Quebec: a) cantilever from the
construction crane at tip shortly before the collapse, and b) from pier afterwards. The tension eye-
bars of the anchor arm were stretched out when the tower was pulled over by the cantilever arm as
the lower chords buckled (Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908).
that much of the distortion had occurred when the rapidly
dropping members hit the ground. Many broken rivets were
found, some with ductile tensile failure of the shank, some
sheared between plates and some with the shank sheared
out of the head, leaving a hole (Fig. 5). There were no brit-
tle failures in any components, although many components
had failed in a ductile manner. Only one eyebar had broken,
resulting from the impact that had torn the head from the
30 centimetre pin, which itself was bent (Quebec Bridge
Enquiry Report, 1908; Middleton, 2001). Brittle failure was
a possibility in an age where the steel transition temperature
might be above 10 degrees Celcius (as has been recently
observed in specimens from the Titanic; Felkins, Leighly, &
Jankovic, 1998); however, this type of failure was unlikely in
warm August.
A board of engineers, appointed by the Royal
Commission, was set up to investigate the collapse; this
board included H.E. Vautelet, a CPR bridge engineer; M.
Fitzmaurice, a Forth Bridge engineer; and R. Modjeski, an
experienced American bridge engineer (Quebec Bridge
Enquiry Report, 1908; Middleton, 2001). They commis-
sioned a series of mechanical tests on bridge components,
which confirmed the high metallurgical quality of the com-
ponents. The largest mechanical test was a compression test
performed on a one-third scale model of the main chord,
which buckled with failure of rivets and loss of
bracing under the load expected below (Quebec
Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908; Smith, 1964;
Middleton, 2001). C.C. Schneider, one of the
leading cantilever designers, recalculated the
load carrying capacity of the design and showed
that the chords were 25 per cent and the ten-
sion bars were 15 per cent below requirements
(Schneider, 1908). The design submitted by
Slapzka to Cooper had not included revised
bracing or taken into account the added weight.
Cooper had accepted the design and later
refused to make changes that would increase
the weight because, apparently, he wanted to
retain a slender appearance. His failure to visit
the site and to pay close attention to messages
resulted in overlooking the warning signs. The
report by the Royal Commission (Quebec
Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908), headed by J.
Galbraith who was the first Dean of
Engineering at the University of Toronto,
placed the principal blame on Cooper, who
later died in seclusion. The report clarified that
the theory of bridge design, the method of con-
struction and the materials were not at fault.
The inadequacy of the Phoenix design meant
that all the steel fabricated for the north can-
tilever (approximately 36,000 tons) had to be
scrapped.
The Ministry of Railways and Canals, which
had taken over the enterprise from the QBRC
and regulated liability payments with the insur-
ance and the Phoenix Bridge Company, instructed an
enlarged Board of Engineers to call tenders for new designs.
The board rejected a design by Vautelet, who then resigned
from the board, and accepted one submitted by the St.
Lawrence Bridge Company (G.H. Duggan, chief engineer),
which had been formed from the Dominion Bridge
Company in Montreal (under P. Johnson) and the Canadian
Bridge Company, under F.C. McMath; (Quebec Bridge
Enquiry Report, 1908; Middleton, 2001). The latter was a
Canadian subsidiary of U.S. Steel that was located just south
of Windsor, Ontario (Warren, 2001). The board was reconsti-
tuted to oversee the development of the design and its
application in the construction; the new board consisted of
R. Modjeski, C.C. Schneider and C.N. Monsarratt, a
Canadian bridge designer (Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report,
1908; Middleton, 2001).
Steel Imports: Infancy of Canadian Industry
As mentioned above, the quality of the steel in the col-
lapsed bridge was high (Table 1). The plates had been hot
rolled from open-hearth steel at Carnegie Steel (in
Pittsburgh), which was already a division of U.S. Steel,
established in 1901 (Duggan, 1918; Making, Shaping and
Treating of Steel, 1957; Watson, 1975; Warren, 1973, 2001).
The eyebars for the tension chords had also been rolled
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Fig. 5. a) The junction at the end of the first bay of the Phoenix cantilever, showing the lower chord 9L extending
towards the tower at the pier; this is the one that buckled because it was 24 per cent below the minimum section
required for the dead load (Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908); b) The girders, over a metre high, buckled and bent
almost double, having popped off the rivets and the latticing that held the four of them together (Quebec Bridge Enquiry
Report, 1908); c) Rivets from the collapsed Phoenix Bridge failed by ductile tension, lateral plastic shear or the shank
pulling out of the head, leaving a holed rim (Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908).
there, but had then been upset, pierced, annealed and
bored at the American Bridge Company in Pennsylvania (a
subsidiary of U.S. Steel). The pins, which were as large as
60 centimetres in diameter, were cast and forged at the
Bethlehem Steel Gun Plant, in Midvale, Pennsylvania. The
lighter steel angles (used for latticing) were produced at
Phoenix Iron Work, Pennsylvania. The decision to source
this work from the United States was expected from a
bridge company with a fabrication shop in the United
States (Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908; Duggan,
1918; Making, Shaping and Treating of Steel, 1957). Unlike
the design of the collapsed bridge, the new bridge was fab-
ricated by two bridge shops in Canada, one near Montreal
and the other near Windsor on the Detroit River (Duggan,
1918). However, the American sources of steel plates, eye-
bars and pins for the new bridge remained the same
because they provided the specified quality at competitive
prices and because they had the metallurgical know-how
and modern equipment. The lighter latticing steel may
have come from Canadian sources.
The first large-scale production of steel in Canada
appears to be a foundry in New Glasgow, Nova Scotia; this
foundry was associated with Ferrona Iron Works, which had
operated a coke blast furnace from 1890 to 1902 (Inwood,
1989; Williams, 1989). In 1901 and 1904, two steel mills
were established in Sydney, Nova Scotia, which was a suit-
able port for receiving raw materials and dispatching prod-
uct. Coal for coking was available from nearby mines and
iron ore was available from a mine on Bell Island,
Newfoundland. These mills later merged to become
Dominion Iron and Steel Company, before further reor-
ganization in 1929. The high silicon and phosphorous
content in Bell Island ore and sulphur content in Cape
Breton coal required production in open-heath furnaces
with successive and basic slag treatments (Williams, 1989).
The plant concentrated on rails, producing 0.8 million
tons of steel in 1911. It never invested in plate or structural
production facilities.
As was the cases with the construction of the previous
bridges on the St. Lawrence, the development of the
Canadian primary metallurgical industry lagged behind in
the installation of basic infrastructure. In 1901, Algoma
Steel was founded at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, and utilized
ore from a mine at Wawa, Ontario (Williams, 1989). Algoma,
like the Sydney mills, concentrated on a single hot working
process because the industry did not grow out of iron works
and, therefore, had no experience with various mechanical
shaping processes. Given the continued expansion of the
railroads during the first two decades of the 20th century,
rails were a significant commodity in Canada. Furthermore,
it was important that the mills be able to earn a profit to war-
rant the investment. Algoma successfully beat off the com-
petition of U.S. Steel, which had mills in Gary Indiana and
later in Duluth (Warren, 2001). Between 1905 and 1915,
Algoma Steel produced 2 million tons of rails.
In 1910, Stelco, the Steel Company of Canada, was cre-
ated by amalgamating several industries, including
Hamilton Steel and Iron and Montreal Rolling Mills. By
1918, Stelco production had grown to a half million tons
per year (Kilbourn, 1960; Williams, 1989). In 1912,
Dofasco, Dominion Foundry and Steel Company started
producing about 30,000 tons per year of castings and
expanded to 300,000 tons in 1918, but had no rolling
mills until 1928 (Kilbourn, 1960). In the period of con-
struction of the Quebec Bridge, the Canadian steel indus-
try was still in its birth stage, whereas the two giants
among the many producers in the United States had
merged into the largest steel company in the world; it also
had the most advanced technology in every type of prod-
uct (Fisher, 1963; Warren, 1973).
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Table 1. Properties of wrought iron and structural steel (utilization* standards**)
Yield Ultimate Ductility % Allowed
ksi MPa ksi MPa Elongation ksi
Wrought iron
Bar, single 28 192 48 330 25
Double refined 31 213 52 358 28 11 ‡ – 16 **
Plate <1> ‡‡ 27 186 48 330 14 (1913-1966) **
Mild steel <2> ‡, #, ‡‡‡ 35 240 62 ‡‡‡ 425 20 21 #,**
Low alloy < 0.25C 51 350 92 630 18 30
High yield S. 51 350 70 480 18 30
Ni steel ‡ 50 345 31 ‡
T1 quench, tempered 88 605 112 770 15 44
Low C rivet 40 275 60 415 25% ASTM **
Mn steel rivet 56 385 76 523 20% 36,42,242 **
* Utilization: 
‡ Quebec Bridge: Ni Steel 52 kt, mild steel <2> 20 kt; 
‡‡ Victoria Tube: <1> 9 kt; 
# Victoria Truss: <2> 22 kt; 
‡‡‡ Forth Bridge: <2> 35 kt.
** Standards: ksi = kilo pounds per square inch; MPa = mega Pascals; kt = kilo tons
Design of the Bridge
Though the principal aim of the Quebec Bridge design
was to complete a structure that could stand up and carry
projected traffic for decades to come, there were a variety of
significant parameters that had to be factored into the
design. One such parameter was the need to develop a sim-
pler structure with less distortion during erection; this was
especially important because it was one of the factors that
had contributed to the inability to recognize the develop-
ment of buckling in the collapsed bridge (Quebec Bridge
Enquiry Report, 1908). The proposed K shape of members
inside panels of equal length allowed each bay to be erected
with all of the rivets driven before proceeding (Figs. 2 and 6;
Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908; Duggan, 1918;
Smith, 1964; Plowden, 1974; Middleton, 2001). Moreover,
the travelling crane could be simpler and lighter when it was
riding forward on the bridge deck of the preceding bay. The
K truss was also easier to machine and fabricate, with less
stringent tolerances. Incidentally, it was due to these consid-
erations that Vautelet’s design was rejected, even though the
chief engineer was to be G.H. Duggan, who had a great deal
of experience with Dominion Bridge (Quebec Bridge
Enquiry Report, 1908; Duggan, 1918).
The bridge was to be built by the normal North American
procedure that had become the world standard (The
Quebec Bridge, 1917; Duggan, 1918; Middleton, 2001). As
explained above, the components were fabricated in the
shops. The workforce assigned to this task did not exceed
500 persons. The field erection, which was restricted to six
months per year for each of the three years of construction,
required about 200 workers, including six gangs of riveters.
The main chords of the bridge were composed of four
girders (laced together) and weighed 380 tons (Fig. 3); the
chord was divided into four parts, each comprised of two
half-length girders to permit transport and lifting on site. As
each bay moved further from the pier, the bottom chords
were reduced in sections by making the girders smaller and
transmitting the forces between bays through pinned con-
nections (Fig. 6). The tension eyebars were also reduced in
sections at each pinned joint. After erection, the free end of
the cantilever arm (which was 177 metres in length)
drooped by 20 metres due to the elastic strain of the com-
pression chords and tension bars (Duggan, 1918). The addi-
tion of the suspended centre span (which was 195 metres in
length and weighed 5,000 tons) caused a further 24 metre
drop in the tip of the cantilever; however, the lower chords
remained straight, which also reduced the wind loading.
The two frames remained vertical (to simplify erection)
rather than slanted inward from a wide base; this required
more lateral bracing to withstand wind loads (The Quebec
Bridge, 1917; Duggan, 1918).
The new bridge was considerably heavier than the one
that had collapsed because of the greater anti-buckling
cross-section of the chords (Figs. 3 and 6) and the tension
bars required to take that weight. The old piers did not have
a sufficient underpinning and a plan to enlarge them
proved unfeasible. Therefore, two completely new piers
were built a short distance upstream, with one pier further
out in the river to shorten the span. The cut stones from the
old piers were used in the construction of the new ones
(Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908; Duggan, 1918). The
caisson construction on one pier was successful, but the sec-
ond suffered endless problems due to large glacial rocks in
the sediment. Thus, the second pier had to be relocated
shoreward, which augmented the span.
The designed weight of the Quebec Bridge was more
than double that of the Forth Bridge in Scotland (1889),
which had a similar span and carrying capacity (Fig. 7),
because the circular cross-sections of the Forth Bridge (Fig.
6) provided the greatest buckling resistance for the least
mass per unit length. In addition, the inward taper of the
Forth Bridge’s principal structures (which increased with
height and towards the span centre)
further reduced the weight. However,
neither of these advantages could be
utilized for the Quebec Bridge because
of the need to erect the bridge in a six-
month season for fieldwork and the
lack of a large band of skilled shipyard
workers (The Quebec Bridge, 1917;
Duggan, 1918). These comments about
weight are made after high-strength Ni
steel had been specified for 70 per cent
of the structure; this will be discussed in
the next section.
This account cannot close without
mention of the final mishap in 1916,
when the suspended span fell during
hoisting into position from barges.
The span was supported at each end
on a beam and two eye-bar chains to
hydraulic jacks on each cantilever arm.
To equalize stresses on the span, each
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Fig. 6. In the cantilever arms (156 metres in length) of the Quebec Bridge, the dimensions and shape of members are reduced in sec-
tion in each bay as they gets closer to the tip, thus carrying less dead load. The inserts compare the sections of the compressive chords
next to the towers for the Forth Bridge and the Phoenix span that collapsed (Duggan, 1918).
corner rested on a saddle with crossed pivots consisting of
three cast semicircular channels and two forged pins (Fig. 8;
Quebec Bridge Enquiry Report, 1908; Schneider, 1908;
Smith, 1964). Crossed channels of the middle casting frac-
tured in such a way that the supporting beam was pushed
out from under the span; it twisted and fell into the river
(killing 16 men), where it remains in a deep channel. None
of the eyebars broke, but some were extended considerably
by plastic deformation. The bridge itself recoiled upwards,
injuring a number of workers but suffering no damage.
Despite the shortage of materials imposed by World War I,
Carnegie Steel was able to roll the needed plates to rebuild
the span. A year later, the final hoisting was accomplished
as originally planned (Fig. 9), but with bearings fashioned
from lead plates (The Quebec Bridge, 1917; Duggan, 1918
Smith, 1964).
High-Strength Nickel Steel
Dating as far back as ancient times, iron alloyed with
nickel in meteorites has been known for its improved prop-
erties, though without knowledge of the cause. M. Faraday
experimented with nickel, chromium and tungsten steels in
1819, but did not commercialize these experiments (Fisher,
1963; Tylecote, 1992; Habashi, 1994). In 1871, R.F. Mushet
produced chromium-tungsten steels for metal cutting that
were considered outstanding for the decade. Chromium-
steels were produced after 1865 for superior hardness and
were used for naval armor and for projectiles; sometimes
nickel was also included to raise the properties. In 1882, R.
Hadfield patented 13 per cent manganese steel and put it
into production; this steel hardens from deformation in
service. During the 1904 to 1914 construction of the
Panama Canal, manganese steel provided wear-resistance
for buckets of steam shovels, dredges, plow blades and
crushers of rock (Gatun Locks, the world’s then biggest con-
crete structure; Bennett, 1915; Fisher, 1963). Nickel steels
were produced after 1885 and, because of their toughness,
were favoured for high-caliber artillery; later, nickel steels
were selected by the worlds’ major navies for armor plate
(Fisher, 1963; Habashi, 1994).
Nickel additions constituted the first high-strength low-
alloy steels to attain application in general engineering. In
1900, simple nickel steels had 90 per cent of the hot-rolled,
high-strength market, but, by 1915, this share had fallen to
30 per cent; nickel-chromium alloys accounted for 30 per
cent of the steel market and chromium (either alone or with
vanadium) accounted for another 35 per cent (Yeo & Miller,
1965). The major source of nickel was in Sudbury, Ontario.
In 1903, the International Nickel Company published a
book describing the advantages of nickel steel in bridges
(Yeo & Miller, 1965). Low alloy nickel steels are not in the
category endowed with improved hardenability for machine
applications that in 1911 were standardized to 11 grades by
the auto industry and over 1935-1940, were reduced to 100
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Fig. 7. Exhibiting the K structure of each bay, the section of the Quebec Bridge has 91 metre-long
towers and banks 45 metres above the water. The dimensions amount to total span of 547 metres
(1,800 feet) and a length of 985 metres. This diagram shows a comparison of dimensions and
weights of the Quebec Bridge (which as plate I section girders) and the Forth Bridge of similar span
(which has sheet and rib circular members; Duggan, 1918).
Fig. 8. The lifting system for the suspended span: a) a guiding frame and two yoke beams, with eye-
bar chains that pass through the jacking mechanisms; b) the support saddle that broke and slid out
from under the span corner; and c) the complete saddle with two round bearings at right angles
with an intermediate cast component that fractured (Duggan, 1918).
Fig. 9. The suspended truss has been jacked partly into position to complete the centre span of the
Quebec Bridge. The four corners of the truss (at the base chords in tension) are connected by forged
pins into vertical tension eyebar hangers that are in turn pinned into the ends of the upper tension
chords of the cantilever. The temporary frames hanging down at each end were to prevent swaying
from the wind.
specifications from 4,000 by the Society of Automotive
Engineers and the American Iron and Steel Industry (Yeo &
Miller, 1965). For massive bridge components where
quenching and tempering were out of the question, the
strengthening arose from the effect of nickel’s transforma-
tion to pearlite during normalizing (i.e. air-cooling).
Nickel steel (in the range of up to 3 per cent nickel) low-
ers the initial transformation on cooling and the eutectoid
temperature by about 20 degrees Celsius per 1 per cent
nickel, also lowering the nose (temperature of minimum
time) for isothermal or continuous cooling transformation
(Hall, 1954; Gillett, 1948; Johnson, 1949; Yeo & Miller,
1965). For steel of up to 3.5 per cent nickel content, marten-
site does not form on air cooling. Lower formation temper-
ature for pearlite produces a finer lamellar mixture of fer-
rite and Fe3C that has much greater strength than does a
plain steel of similar carbon content. Nickel also reduces the
eutectoid composition by up to 0.4 per cent carbon, which
means that, for a given carbon content, the volume of
pearlite is larger; this also raises the strength. In addition,
the nickel atoms (which are relatively insoluble in Fe3C) end
up in the ferrite and, thus, cause considerable strengthen-
ing. Fortunately, these strengthening features are additive
but do not reduce the toughness because of the structural
refinement associated with the reduced transformation tem-
perature (Yeo & Miller, 1965).
For the new Quebec Bridge, a decision was made to use
high-strength nickel stell for 70 per cent of the structure. As
a result, the design strength of nickel steel in the bridge was
raised to 213 megapascals (31 kilo pounds per square inch)
compared to 152 megapascals (22 kilo pounds per square
inch) for carbon steel, at a cost factor of 2.5 (The Quebec
Bridge, 1917; Duggan, 1918; Middleton, 2001). For mod-
ern structural steel, the allowed stress is 300 megapascals
(43 kilo pounds per square inch) ASTM A514 (Gillett, 1948;
for such a steel (1.4 nickel, 0.9 copper, 0.2 molybdenum and
0.2 carbon), the yield strength is 400 megapsacals (57 kilo
pounds per square inch) with 36 per cent elongation, com-
pared to about 1,150 megapascals with 15 per cent elonga-
tion for quench and tempered 4340 steel (0.8 nickel, 1.8
copper, 0.3 molybdenum and 0.42 carbon; Gillett, 1948; Yeo
& Miller, 1965).
Consequences of the Bridge
The new Quebec Bridge design was a great success
because of its ease of shop and field construction. The
fourth bridge across the St. Lawrence and the first solely
road bridge was the Jacques Cartier cantilever span,
designed by C.N. Monsarratt to have a K panel design
and be 330 metres in length. The Jacques Cartier Bridge
was built in 1929 across the Montreal harbour by
Dominion Bridge; the steel used in its construction was
produced at Algoma, which began heavy rolling in about
1921 (Ponts du Quebec, 1975). The Howrath Bridge in
Calcutta was built in 1945 with a span of 450 metres and
was the third longest cantilever bridge; it carried both
road and light rail traffic.
Since the construction of the Quebec Bridge, the can-
tilever design has been used in more than a dozen bridges
with spans longer than 300 metres. However, suspension
construction was used for bridges with longer spans because
suspension bridges had a much more economical use of
materials to build them for highway traffic and even for rail-
way use with sufficiently rigid decks.
The Quebec Bridge was never used to its full potential as
a railway bridge because it was not an essential part of any
one network, but was instead an interconnection between
several rail lines that crossed at other places (Ponts du Quebec,
1975; Middleton, 2001; McQueen, 2008a, 2008b). Due to
near bankruptcy of the Grand Trunk and other aforemen-
tioned railways, they were nationalized as the Canadian
National Railway and reorganized in about 1924. The
Quebec Bridge became part of the system, although it
remained under the direction of the National Harbor
Board. Since 1917, no other railway bridges have been built
across the St. Lawrence; there remain only three, including
the Victoria Truss Bridge and the CPR Bridge at LaSalle
(McQueen, 2008a, 2008b; Ponts du Quebec, 1975). 
The Quebec Bridge is currently used for passenger serv-
ice between Montreal and Quebec City, which represents
one segment of the rapid transit corridor that stretches west-
ward to Windsor. As part of the privatization of CNR in
about 1995, the Quebec Bridge was turned over completely
to CNR with a grant for refurbishing. The CNR bridge
group constructed a computer model and, upon recalcula-
tion, proved that the bridge could sustain all the expected
modern loading (Sweeney & Oommen, 1996). Thorough
inspection resulted in replacement of some minor elements
and led to added protection against salt spray, especially
near the roadway (Sweeney & Oommen, 1996).
As automobile use grew, the demand for roadways on the
Quebec Bridge also expanded. Therefore, in 1929, the sin-
gle lane was changed to two lanes by removing one of the
rail tracks. This road became very congested, so a parallel
six-lane highway bridge was built in 1970; the Pierre
Laporte suspension bridge has a span of 668 metres, which
is the longest in Canada (Ponts du Quebec, 1975). There is no
bridge to the east of Quebec City, except for the suspension
bridge which has a span of 318 metres and runs to Ile
d’Orleans across a narrow non-shipping channel (Ponts du
Quebec, 1975). During the period between 1995 and 2000,
the CNR, in cooperation with the Quebec government,
refurbished the bridge and applied a modern corrosion-
resistant coating. Furthermore, extensive lighting was added
as a tourist attraction (Sweeney & Oommen, 1996).
Conclusion
The challenge of crossing the ocean-shipping channel of
the St. Lawrence at Quebec City was resolved by means of a
cantilever design that remains the world’s longest. Because
of inattention to detail by the Phoenix Bridge designer and
the consulting engineers, the first attempted bridge was not
strong enough and collapsed before completion. The final
design, led by Dominion Bridge engineers, utilized a new K
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bracing in each bay that simplified both fabrication and
field erection, as well as reduced dead-load distortion; this
approach was then replicated in several long-span can-
tilevers. The steel plates were rolled from open-hearth melts
by Carnegie Steel Mills because the Canadian steel industry
was in its infancy and did not have suitable hot rolling facil-
ities. The use of nickel steel greatly reduced the weight of
the bridge because it allowed for 50 per cent greater
strength (compared to similar carbon steel) due to the
increased volume of refined pearlite. There is no bridge
crossing the shipping channel eastward, down-river from
Quebec; therefore, the Quebec Bridge served as a vital rail
and road link until a parallel suspension highway bridge was
built in 1970.
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